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ROY SCHOTLAND*
In light of the recent extraordinary rise in judicial campaign spending,
illustrated in Ohio's 2000judicial elections (and elsewhere, and in Ohio again in
2002), we must consider improving the Model Code of Judicial Conduct The
1999 amendments to the Code addressed campaign finance, but did not address
two major problems. The first one is the absence of limits on aggregate
contributions from law firms; only Texas has such limits. This gap allows large
contributions from law firms to go to judges presiding in cases in which those
firms participate, circumventing the recusal and disqualification triggers. The
second problem is the prevalence and impact of unregulated "issue ads" by non-
party, non-PAC interest groups, which are not subject to disclosure
requirements because they are not "explicit advocacy. " These "stealth "ads also
evade recusal and disqualification triggers.
I propose, for balance, to address the problems together. First, I urge adopting
an aggregate contribution limit as in Texas' "Judicial Campaign Fairness Act."
Second, I urge requiring disclosure of spending for large advertising efforts by
non-candidate, non-party group- in judicial elections, given their differences
from other elections. Focusing such requirements on large efforts addresses
those with the most impact, while eliminating a "chill" effect for small groups
and small contributors. Relatedly, I propose requiring parties in a case to certfy
that all campaign contributions and expenditures by the party and its counsel
regarding a judge in that proceeding have been disclosed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ohio's recent experience highlights the need to consider improving on the
1999 amendments of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The
amendments added several provisions on campaign finance-for example, on full
disclosure, on setting limits on contributions (the level of the limit to be set in
light of the jurisdiction's experience), and on disqualification of judges if a party
or counsel made an illegally large contribution.'
Two major problems are not touched by those amendments. In the 2000
judicial elections, both of these problems loomed large in Ohio and elsewhere.
One problem is that, although many States limit how much any individual can
contribute, only Texas limits how much a single law firm can give. In fact,
sometimes one single firm's lawyers, spouses and employees give so much
together that striking problems are created. To correct this, we need only adopt
Texas's thorough, fair provision.
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The second problem is that "issue ads," so controversial in nonjudicial
elections, became major factors in Ohio's and Michigan's elections in 2000. That
meant that the identifies of very large contributors to those races were undisclosed
to the public and, worse, functioned to evade the recusal process that exists to
correct for any unduly large contributions.
The proposal to address these two problems is balanced: One proposed
provision would aim at the major weapon used by some of "the trial lawyer side,"
and the other provision would aim at the major weapon used by some of the big-
corporation or single-issue-group side.
II. A LIMIT ON AGGREGATE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ANY SINGLE LAW FIRM
The first proposed provision aims at limiting how much any single law firm
can contribute to a judicial candidate. Although the 1999 Model Code
amendments do not include such a provision, it was one of the recommendations
of the ABA Task Force Report2 that led to these amendments. The amendments
did not include this provision, not because of any disagreement, but simply as a
result of the streamlining that occurred as the proposals progressed through the
ABA's process between 1998 and 1999.
Since 1995, Texas' "Judicial Campaign Fairness Act" has included a $30,000
aggregate limit on how much any single law firm (i.e., the firm, partners,
employees, spouses, etc.) can contribute to a judicial candidate.3 That figure, six
times the $5,000 cap on any individual's contribution, was deemed a fair balance
between, on the one hand, the large firms the contributions from which could
easily go above $30,000, and on the other hand, the small firms, particularly
plaintiffs' firms, which have far fewer potential donors. In fact, while in other
states large firms often do produce large aggregate contributions, in many states
we find that plaintiffs' firms, however small in number of partners, make
contributions of more than $200,000.
The 1998 ABA Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions gave the
following reasons for having such a per-firm limit:
If there is no [such limit], then the limits on contributions from individuals have a
far greater impact on small firms than on large ones. However, we recognize that
flexibility is needed to set fair limits on aggregate contributions from firms. If too
low a per-firm limit is set (e.g., for all firms regardless of size, five times the limit
on an individual's contributions), then members and employees of large firms
2 A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON LAWYER'S POLriCAL CONTRIBUTIONS, REPORT, pt. 2, at 30-31
(1998) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
3 TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.157 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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may be barred from political participation. On the other hand, if the per-firm limit
is too high, it will be viewed as only a facade.4
The Texas provisions became law in 1995. How well have they worked?
Because of dramatic "cooling-down and quieting" of Texas judicial elections in
the three cycles since 1995, all one can say is that the provisions seem to work
fine, so far.5
From Ohio, we have an example illustrating the concerns about aggregate
contributions from a single law firm.6 This involves the Ohio Supreme Court and
a suit for damages against Conrail. Plaintiff's daughter, Wightman, had been
killed by a train when she drove onto a grade crossing despite closed gates and
flashing lights. The extensive proceedings involved three trials: a jury trial for
compensatory damages, a bench trial for punitive damages, and then after an
appeal, a jury trial for punitive damages. There then followed another appeal,
followed by a final appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. That appeal was sought by
both sides after the second jury had awarded punitive damages of $25,000,000,
reduced by the trial judge to $15,000,000.
Plaintiff was represented by Murray & Murray Co., a firm that includes nine
members of the Murray family. Before the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to hear
the appeal on February 18, 1998, campaign contributions were made to two
associate justices by that firm, by nine Murrays in the firm, and by seven Murray
spouses. Those contributions were made on February 9 to one justice, and to the
other justice between January 19 and January 21. Each contribution complied
with the relevant legal limit on contributions and totaled $25,000 to each justice.
Those justices ran for reelection in November 1998, and according to their post-
election campaign finance reports, these contributions turned out to be 4.4% of
one justice's total, and 4.7% of the other's. These contributions were, for each
justice, among the largest received.
Both justices participated in the oral argument on November 10, 1998. Their
campaign finance reports were filed a month later, and in January 1999 Conrail
filed a motion seeking the recusal of each justice. In October 1999, without the
court or either of those justices addressing that motion, the court decided in favor
of plaintiffs. Conrail subsequently made these facts its major basis for seeking
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, but it was denied.7
Another example comes from the Michigan Supreme Court elections in
2000. As of September, Michigan's sixteenth largest law firm (Sommers,
4 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at n. 51.
5 On Texas's recent quietude, see Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000:
Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REv. MICH. STATE U.-DETRorr C. L. 849, 881-82.
6 This example is also set forth in Roy A. Schotland, Campaign Finance in Judicial
Elections, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1489, 1503-04 (2001).
7 Consol. Rail Corp. v. Wightman, 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1012 (2000).
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Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, which includes leading personal injury lawyers)
had contributed more than $225,000 to the three Democratic candidates. That
constituted more than 20% of the total contributed to those candidates--29% of
one candidate's total, 19% for another, and just under 19% for one who was once
a partner at that firm. 8
Both Ohio and Michigan have explicit limits on individual contributions in
judicial campaigns-in Ohio $5,000, in Michigan $3,400.
Would you line up with Texas, or with Ohio, Michigan, et. al.? Many
observers of campaign finance express particular concern about fund-raising from
single or concentrated sources. That is, many observers believe that contributions
from many sources, whatever the total amount, are less problematic.
III. DISCLOSURE OF SPENDING AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO LARGE
ADVERTISING EFFORTS IN JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS BY
NON-CANDIDATE, NON-PARTY GROUPS
Everyone is familiar with "issue ads" by interest groups--more with non-
judicial races than judicial, but active in both realms. These ads name a candidate
but under current law do not "expressly advocate" support for or opposition to the
candidate, and so do not come under almost any existing regulation, disclosure or
otherwise. But in the eyes of almost everyone except "the law," such ads do
unarguably support or oppose a candidate. In addition to such "issue ads," even
ads that do "expressly advocate" are arguably outside the requirements of some
states' laws on disclosure of the amount being spent and the contributors to the
spending. For example, Chamber of Commerce ads in the Mississippi Supreme
Court races in 2000 led to litigation that is still pending; United States Supreme
Court review will be sought for the Fifth Circuit's decision that the advertising in
question was not express advocacy. A petition for certiorari of a separate, related
decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court was denied in November 2002.9
8 See Dawson Bell, Law Firm Raises Cash, Eyebrows in Judicial Races, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Sept. 27, 2000, http://www.freep.com/newslibrary (search terms: "Law Firm Raises
Cash"). A new study by the Michigan Campaign Finance Network gives different figures,
according to which: For 2000, that firm, Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, gave
$274,987; for one candidate, they gave 11%, to another 10%, and to a third 8%. MICH.
CAMPAIGN FIN. NETWORK, SPECIAL INTERESTS V. PUBLIC VALUES - FUNDING MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGNS, 1994-2000, at 41,43, 45 (2002), available at www.mcfn.org. (at
"Reports" hyperlink). In 1998 and 1996, the firm's top percentage gift was 16%. Id. at 29, 37.
From 1994 to 2000, the firm gave a total $659,417 to ten candidates, making them the
second largest contributor to supreme court races. Id. at 8. The largest was Republican State
Committee, at $661,145; the third largest was Michigan Trial Lawyers PAC at $340,000. Id.
9 Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 2002 WL
31018269 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2002).
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Although the Chamber has refused to disclose anything beyond the fact of its
sponsorship (not only in Mississippi, but also in Ohio, where ads were run by
Chamber affiliates), we know from a Wall Street Journal front-page article that
the Chamber's efforts in several states' judicial races in 2000 were supported by
$1,000,000 contributions from each of the following: Wal-Mart,
DaimlerChrysler, Home Depot, and the American Council of Life Insurers.
General Motors, a major supporter of related Chamber efforts, "'told them that
our [money] cannot be used in judicial races.' "10 May I suggest that the Chamber
is like the Taliban? They both like burqas-the Taliban for women, the Chamber
for their contributors. We need to get the burqas out of Ohio.
Some chief justices and others are concerned not merely about the general
non-disclosure of major efforts in judicial campaigns, but-and here judicial
elections differ from other elections-also about the actual or potential "stealth"
aspect of such non-disclosure. If a state limits the amount of contributions to
judicial races, we all know that efforts to circumvent that limitation might take
two routes: "independent spending," or contributions to a party or PAC. Those
routes still trigger full disclosure. However, another route--"issue ads"--entirely
evades disclosure.
Without disclosure, a lawyer or potential litigation party can put large sums
into a judicial race, entirely free of any fear of efforts to disqualify the judge. Such
"stealth" campaign efforts wipe out the judiciary's ability to assure that no litigant
is unduly favored or disfavored, and also erode the public's confidence in the
fairness of the judges.
Ohio's League of Women Voters has a proposed bill on disclosure, set forth
in the Appendix, with "annotations" changing the threshold levels that would
trigger disclosure. The change is made to focus on only large advertising efforts,
for two reasons: (1) We believe that small advertising efforts matter little if at all,
and (2) constitutional values that would protect small efforts from required
disclosure are not in play for large efforts. Of course, what is "large" will differ in
different jurisdictions and different eyes. I urge raising the League's disclosure
trigger-level aggregate amount of spending from $1000 to $10,000 or $25,000 on
"electioneering communication" efforts. On which contributors' names (etc.)
would be disclosed, I also urge raising their trigger-level aggregate of
contributions from $100 to $5000 or $10,000.
These higher levels reflect two goals. First, the advertising and similar efforts
that matter are not the tiny ones but the substantial ones mounted by substantial
interest groups. Such efforts often use "stealth ads" to avoid the disclosure that
would come with contributions to the candidates, parties, or PACs. Substantial
efforts "matter" both in the impact they may have and in the value of assuring that
the public has information about such efforts. The point is that disclosure will be
10 Jim VandeHei, Major Business Lobby Wins Back Its Clout By Dispensing Favors,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001, at Al.
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most meaningful if limited to major efforts, whether the "trigger level" should be,
for example, $10,000 or somewhat higher or lower.
Second, the more substantial the effort, the more significant the public
interest and the less concern there is about "chilling" smaller groups or
individuals. Also, the modest burdens of disclosure would be no problem for
larger efforts but could be for smaller ones.
As for disclosing who contributed and how much, in addition to the
considerations mentioned above, there is a personal privacy interest, and a
possible fear of disclosure, that is reflected in several Supreme Court decisions." I
Such concerns fade and even vanish as one raises the "trigger" amount to a level
that protects freedom of association by bringing into the sunlight only people or
entities with such substantial resources that, on the one hand, have no reason to
fear retaliation, and on the other hand, warrant far greater public interest in
knowing just who has such significant interest in the particular campaign.
Further, because "stealth" campaign efforts undermine safeguards to assure
that judges do not hear cases involving counsel or parties who make contributions
over the legal limit, I urge that the Court adopt a rule along lines like the one
below. Indeed, I believe such a rule is a sine qua non for any effective effort to
assure against litigants' "stealth" efforts to "buy their judge."
IV. ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE BY PARTIES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Any party to, or counsel in, a judicial proceeding shall provide to that court
and all other parties in that proceeding a sworn affidavit that she, he, or it has filed
(or been included in a filing by another person or entity) a statement disclosing all
her, his, or its campaign expenditures or contributions in connection with the
election campaign involving the justice(s) or judge(s) presiding in that
proceeding. If any such expenditures have not been included in prior filings, the
affidavit shall include the amount(s) contributed by and/or spent by the affiant,
and a brief description of the advertising or other efforts involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Adoption of the above "paired" proposals will go far toward reducing the
problems that are so exacerbated by the recent extraordinary rise in campaign
spending.' 2
I1 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,341-42 (1995).
12 In 2000, spending by "outside" groups in judicial elections was dimensionally greater
than ever before; in the five "hottest" states, it came to at least $16,000,000. The supreme court
candidates' spending in 2000's elections totaled $45,495,000, a 61% rise over the previous peak
in 1998 and setting records in ten of the twenty states that held such elections. Schotland, supra
note 5, at 850-51 (2002).
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Appendix
Draft Language for Disclosure of Electioneering Communications*
(Sham Issue Ads in Supreme Court Elections)
Section 3517.01 of the Revised Code is amended by adding at the end of
division (B) the following new subdivision:
(22) "Electioneering communication" means any public political advertising,
as defined in section 3517. 105(A)(1), that refers to one or more identified
candidates, as defined in division (B)(17)(c) of this section, for the office
of Chief Justice or Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio and that is
disseminated within 30 days before a primary election or within 60 days
before a general election for such office to an audience that includes
members of the electorate for such election.
"Electioneering communication" does not include any communication
that:
(a) appears in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed
through the facilities of any broadcasting station, cable, or
satellite, or newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, unless
such facilities are owned or controlledtby any political party,
legislative campaign fund, political action committee, or
candidate;
(b) is disseminated by any corporation, organization, or association
exclusively to its owners, stockholders, members, or executive
or administrative personnel;
(c) is a voting record or voting guide, in printed or electronic
format, that:
(i) presents information in an educational manner solely
about the voting record or position on an issue of one or
more candidates;
(ii) is not coordinated with any candidate, campaign
committee, or agent of a candidate; and,
* Ohio League of Women Voters' proposed statute (on file with author).
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(iii) does not contain a phrase such as "vote for", "re-elect",
"support", "defeat", or "reject" or other language that,
when read as a whole, and with limited reference to
external events, can have no reasonable meaning other
than to urge the election or defeat of one or more
candidates; or
(d) constitutes an expenditure or independent expenditure, as
defined in section 3517.01(B).
Section 3517.10 of the Revised Code is amended by adding at the end
the following new division:
(li) Every person, as defined in section 3517.01(B)(17)(a), and every
legislative campaign fund, political party, or other entity that makes one
or more disbursements for electioneering communications in an
aggregate amount in excess of [$__ ] during any calendar year shall
file additional statements as follows:
(1) Statements shall be filed within two business days of each
disclosure date on a form prescribed under this division, by
electronic means of transmission as provided in this section and
section 3517.106 of the Revised Code, or until January 1, 2003,
on computer disk as provide in section 3517.106 of the Revised
Code. For purposes of this division, "disclosure date" means:
(a) the first date during any calendar year on which an
electioneering communication financed by
disbursements in an aggregate amount in excess of
[$ _ ] is broadcast, published, mailed, or
otherwise disseminated; and
(b) any date thereafter during such calendar year on which
an electioneering communication is disseminated if the
disbursements for such communication have not been
previously disclosed in a statement required under this
division.
(2) Each statement required under this division shall contain the
following information:
(a) the full name and address of each person or entity
making the disbursement, of any person or entity
[Vol. 64:127
PROPOSED LEGISLA TION
sharing or exercising direction or control over the
activities of the maker of the disbursement, and of the
treasurer or other custodian of the books and accounts
of the maker of the disbursement;
(b) in the case of a political action committee, the
registration number assigned to the committee under
division (D)(1) of this section;
(c) the elections to which the electioneering
communication pertains, and the names of the identified
candidates;
(d) the amount of each disbursement more than [$ j
made for electioneering communications disseminated
during the period covered by the statement, the full
name and address of each person or entity to which the
disbursement was made, and the aggregate amount of
disbursements made for electioneering communications
during the calendar year;
(e) the full names and addresses of each person or entity
from whom the maker of the disbursement received
contributions in an aggregate amount of more than
[$__ ] during the period beginning on the first day of
the preceding calendar year and ending on the
disclosure date, the aggregate amount of contributions
from each person or entity, and for individual
contributors, the name of the individual's current
employer, if any, or if the individual is self-employed,
the individual's occupation; provided, however, that if
the disbursement was paid out of a segregated bank
account that consists of funds contributed solely by
individuals directly to such account for electioneering
communications, the statement shall include the
foregoing information with respect to all individuals
who contributed an aggregate amount of more than [$-
__ ] to such account during the period beginning on
the first day of the preceding calendar year and ending
on the disclosure date.
(3) The failure to submit a statement required under this subdivision
or the knowing submission of a statement containing false
2003]
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information shall subject the person or entity responsible for
filing the statement to a civil penalty up to three times the
amount of total disbursements made for electioneering
communications disseminated during the period covered by the
statement. The penalty, which shall be the exclusive remedy for
each violation, may be collected by the Secretary of State in a
civil action brought in the Common Pleas Court of Franklin or
in the county where the defendant resides.
